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TRADE INTEGRATION AND CROATIAN
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Croatian National Bank
Zagreb
Boris Vujèiæ*
Croatian National Bank
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the trade criteria for EU membership and the
extent to which Croatia fulfills those criteria. The relationship between
trade criteria and the economic ability to pursue EU accession is dis-
cussed and a gravity model of Croatian trade is constructed in order to
measure the level of trade diversification achieved in an objective man-
ner. Significant trade biases towards the former Yugoslav republics are
found as well as an emerging bias in imports from Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC). Moreover, the process of trade liberaliza-
tion that was promoted recently did in general not significantly contribute
to trade diversification towards countries with which preferential trade
agreements had recently been concluded, rather reinforced existing bias-
es, although there are some differences between export and import flows.
In order to mitigate the consequences of delays in the integration process-
es, reduce long-term costs of trade restructuring and encourage the trade
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integration with the EU necessary for successful accession, Croatia
should seek to eliminate the remaining institutional barriers to trade with
the EU. Also, the continuation and faster implementation of structural
reforms are necessary preconditions for an increase of openness in trade.
Key words:
trade integration, preferential trade agreements, gravity analysis,
Croatia
INTRODUCTION
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent integration of
CEEC into the EU economy can probably best be traced through the
dynamics of trade integration. The conclusion of Association agree-
mentsi in mid-1990s liberalized trade among them and created the
opportunity for the expansion of bilateral trade. The transition countries
that were the fastest and most successful in implementing economic
reforms also managed to make the best use of the new opportunities to
expand trade. However, the level of trade integration was not just an
indicator of progress in economic integration; the European
Commission also used the level of trade integration achieved, amongst
other things, as an indicator of the ability to pursue further integration
into the EU. Moreover, some researchers used measures of  trade inte-
gration in order to estimate in an objective manner whether candidates
were fulfilling EU accession criteria. However, trade integration was not
always a success story. Fears of rapid expansion of labor-intensive
imports (so called “sensitive products”) from the CEEC and resulting
employment losses in labor-intensive industries prompted the EU to
keep barriers on imports of sensitive products. Thus EU policies towards
the candidates did not always support rapid and complete integration.
This paper aims to identify the progress Croatia has made in eco-
nomic integration with the EU. Croatian progress in trade integration
requires particularly careful assessment because of the importance of
trade integration with the EU for the overall economic integration of the
CEEC. The consequences of delays in the integration processes on the
part of Croatia are discussed and proposals for policies to reduce the bias-
es identified in Croatian trade patterns are provided as well. In the first
chapter the economic criteria for EU accession and the role of trade inte-
gration in fulfilling those criteria are discussed. In the following chapter
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trade integration is placed within the framework of transition. The role of
trade integration in the transition of the CEEC is explored using standard
indicators of trade integration with the old EU member states. In addition
to this, the results of more sophisticated studies based on gravity analysis
of trade flows are presented. Further on, a gravity model of trade flows is
utilized in order to assess the trade integration of Croatia with the EU and
the biases that characterize Croatian foreign trade. Finally, we conclude
by proposing policies to reduce identified biases.
TRADE INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC
CRITERIA FOR EUROPEAN UNION
ACCESSION
The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 decided on a
number of criteria for accession to be met by applicant countries. These
“Copenhagen criteria” constitute political and economic requirements
for membership and requirement of the ability to assume obligations
arising from membership or institutional capacity for membership.
Economic criteria are defined as “the existence of a functioning market
economy” and “the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union” (European Commission, 2001).
Fulfillment of the first criterion, the existence of a functioning market
economy, is necessary before the Council can make a positive decision
on accession, based on the opinion of the Commission, while it is
important that the second criterion, if not yet fulfilled, can be expected
in the near future, between the positive decision taking place and the
actual moment of accession.
Although straightforward interpretation of the economic criteria
might envisage an examination of trade integration between potential
candidates and the Union, the Commission actually seeks for a mixture
of different, more and less measurable, characteristics of the candi-
dates’ economies. Concretely, in the first economic criterion, the
Commission seeks to assess whether (1) an equilibrium between
demand and supply has been established by the free interplay of market
forces and whether prices, as well as trade, are liberalized; (2) signifi-
cant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit
(bankruptcies) are absent; (3) the legal system, including the regulation
of property rights, is in place, with laws and contracts being enforce-
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able; (4) macroeconomic stability has been achieved, including ade-
quate price stability and sustainable public finances and external
accounts; (5) there is a broad consensus about the essentials of econom-
ic policy; and finally (6) the financial sector is developed sufficiently
well to channel savings towards productive investment. The ability to
cope with the competitive pressures within the Union is a stronger cri-
terion than the existence of a functioning market economy. It assumes
(1) the existence of a functioning market economy, with a sufficient
degree of macroeconomic stability for economic agents to make deci-
sions in a climate of stability and predictability, which is the first
requirement for the fulfillment of that criterion. In addition to this, the
second criterion assesses (2) the existence of a sufficient amount, at an
appropriate cost, of human and physical capital, including infrastruc-
ture (energy supply, telecommunications, transport, etc.), education and
research, and future developments in this field; (3) the extent to which
government policy and legislation influence competitiveness through
trade policy, competition policy, state aid, support for Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises, etc.; (4) the degree and the pace of trade
integration a country achieves with the Union before enlargement (this
applies to both the volume and the nature of goods already traded with
member states); (5) the proportion of small firms, partly because small
firms tend to benefit more from improved market access, and partly
because a dominance of large firms could indicate a greater reluctance
to adjust (European Commission, 2001).
As the Commission assesses eleven listed conditions in a sub-
jective manner, its opinions have been subject to criticisms. This sub-
jectivity is evident since the final verdict is not clear until one gets to
the conclusion of the Commission’s opinion. Nilsson (2000) tries to
formulate economic criteria for EU accession more objectively. In
accordance with the definition employed by the Commission, Nilsson
interprets the Copenhagen criteria as a high level of trade integration.
Attainment of a sufficiently high level of trade integration, according to
Nilsson, at the same time means successful penetration of the markets
of Western European countries and therefore the ability to withstand
competitive pressures on those markets. The Commission assesses the
level of trade integration within the second economic criterion, or the
ability to cope with the competitive pressures within the Union.
However, it is only one of several indicators Commission uses vaguely
to describe fulfillment of the required criteria. In order to avoid subjec-
tive judgment on sufficiency or insufficiency of trade integration,
Nilsson utilizes the gravity approach to the analysis of trade flows in
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order to derive trade potentials. Nilsson then compares trade potentials
inferred from the gravity analysis with the actual trade level (see Box 1
for detailed elaboration of the gravity approach).
The following chapter elaborates why it is possible to use the
difference between the actual trade flows and trade potentials as an
indicator of progress in transition and the ability to integrate success-
fully into the EU. Further on, the results of studies that use the gravity
approach to assess the level and evolution of trade integration between
CEEC and the EU from the period preceding the transition until the late
1990s are presented. The gravity approach has some serious limitations
and it is therefore not possible to rely on that approach only in order to
draw a complete picture of the competitiveness of the economy, espe-
cially if there are imbalances between merchandise exports and
imports, as there are in the case of Croatiaii. Therefore, other methods
are sometimes employed in order to evaluate the competitiveness of the
economy, such as comparative advantages revealed, indicators of sec-
toral concentration and differentiation of trade (or trade specialization)
and indicators of intra-industry and inter-industry trade (Astrov, 2001). 
Box 1 The gravity approach to the analysis of trade flow
Gravity models take care of some open issues arising from
the trade openness and trade pattern comparisons that are routinely
used by the European Commission in their assessments and it is
therefore quite a sophisticated approach. Gravity models utilize
economic potentials and trading costs, usually approximated with
geographic distances, in an analysis of bilateral trade flows or in
order to estimate trade potentials between pairs of countries. A
gravity model is usually estimated over a pool of countries for a
number of years using cross-section or panel methods. However,
because we are solely interested in the pattern of Croatian trade, we
shall rely on a single-country equation. A single-country specifica-
tion, apart from serving our aim well, also avoids some troubling
specification problems that arise in pooled estimations. First, differ-
ences in the relative remoteness of trading partners produce sys-
temic biases that depend on the location of a specific country
(Brenton and Di Mauro, 1998). Furthermore, the issue of hetero-
geneity of the countries may also be alleviated with a single-coun-
try specification, which is the reason some studies use such specifi-
cations. The gravity equation that we estimate, in its simplest form,
is the following semi-log specification:
TRi=β0+ β1BDPi+ β2UDALJi+ΣγkDik
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where TRi stands for the natural logarithm of the trade flowiii
between the Croatia and country i, GDPi for the natural logarithm
of the gross domestic product of the country i, measured at
exchange rate parity and DISTi for the distance between Zagreb and
the capital of country i. Using road distances would probably be
more justified than using air distances because most goods are
transported to Croatia by the road, but that would exclude overseas
countries and therefore significantly reduce the number of observa-
tions. Finally, Dik stands for dummies for different groups of trade
partners (old EU member states, CEECiv and former Yugoslav
republics, individually), while other studies in this field use those
variables also to isolate the impact of preferential trade agreements,
adjacency or language similarity, which decrease the costs of
engaging in international trade.
The gravity approach was launched as a more or less “atheo-
retical” approach to the analysis of trade flows. However, the idea of
using economic potentials and trading costs in an analysis of bilater-
al trade flows proved to have deeper theoretical roots than was
thought at first. Frankel (1997) surveys literature that tried to root the
gravity approach in different theoretical rationales, the Hekscher-
Ohlin model as well as the theory of imperfect substitutes. The
establishment of the theoretical foundations of the gravity approach
also contributed to some extensions of the model, an important one
being the inclusion of “similarity” or “dissimilarity” variables to test
for the relevance of different trade theories. Although compatible
with the range of trade theories, the gravity approach remains unable
to predict trade structure – a composition of the goods a country is
supposed to import and export. In order to get an answer to that
question, one has to look into the underlying theory of trade.
TRANSITION AND TRADE INTEGRATION
At the onset of the transition, three distinct forces were shaping
the trade pattern of a typical transition country. First, policies of stabi-
lization, liberalization and privatization removed most of the existing
barriers to their international trade and made possible an increase in
trade openness. Further on, the collapse of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON), a trade block comprising the
Soviet Union and the CEEC, contributed to the creation of a new eco-
nomic geography and diversification of the excess trade that existed
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within that trade block. Finally, the dissolution of multi-national states
like the USSR, the Czech Republic and Yugoslavia, immediately
increased the openness of the new countries by turning what had previ-
ously constituted internal trade into international trade. However, the
creation of borders and the barriers they create worked in the opposite
direction. New borders decreased the level of trade between the newly
independent states, if the formerly internal trade is also consideredv.
Figure 1 Trade openness ratios of selected transition countries (ratio of total
trade in goods and services to GDP, in %)
67
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
Czech Republic
HungaryBulgaria
Slovenia
Slovakia
Poland
Sources: WIIW (1997; 2000; 2003).
Before the transition process started, the transition countries
were relatively closed economies except for the trade flows that exist-
ed among them. This was a consequence of the restrictions imposed by
central planning, and of the planners’ aspirations to insulate the coun-
try from influences of the world economy. All those countries had com-
plicated regulations concerning foreign trade, foreign currency transac-
tions and capital account controls, so it is not surprising that many stud-
ies find them to be less involved in international trade than the coun-
tries of Western Europe (see, for example, Havrylyshyn and Pritchett,
1991; Baldwin, 1994; Winters and Wang, 1994). Restrictive regulation
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was radically liberalized very early, at the beginning of the transition,
which encouraged the expansion of foreign trade. Indeed, trade open-
ness ratios (TOR – ratio of foreign trade in goods to GDP) of the CEEC
were clearly rising during the 1990s. The average TOR of the six select-
ed countries more than doubled by the end of the decade from the level
of below 50% in 1990. Moreover, studies confirmed that the increase
of trade openness was related to progress in structural reforms, so coun-
tries that conducted deeper and faster reforms (measured by transition
index, EBRD, 2004) also experienced larger increases in their trade
openness (Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash, 1998).
In conjunction with experiencing an increase in their trade
openness, transition countries also changed the geographic patterns of
their foreign trade. Such a change was a consequence of the collapse
of COMECON, which diverted their foreign trade towards other mem-
bers of that trade bloc. Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991), on the basis
of gravity analysis, conclude that the CEEC did not need to raise the
level of their overall trade, but they had to increase the share of trade
with Western European countries from the level of between 20% and
30%, where it stood at the beginning of the 1980's, to the level of
between 60% and 80% in order to adjust their actual trade to trade
potentials. Using the gravity approach again, Winters and Wang
(1994) draw a somewhat different conclusion for the mid-1980s.
Although intra-COMECON trade, according to their estimates, broad-
ly matched the potential, trade with market economies was by and
large below potential. Hungary appeared to be the most open of the
CEEC, with actual trade with market economies reaching less than a
third of the potential. Another influential study by Baldwin (1994) on
the trade potentials of the CEEC is especially interesting for our pur-
poses because it provides estimates of the Croatian potential trade
structure. Baldwin (1994) estimated the potential exports of the CEEC
to the twelve EU members in 1989 (the last pre-transition year) to be
4.8 times higher than actual exports, while potential imports were esti-
mated at 2.1 times the actual imports. Simultaneously, actual trade
with other members of the Eastern bloc was between 0.4 times and 1.6
times higher than the trade potentials. According to these estimates,
the twelve EU members should in the long run attract as much as
approximately 60% of Croatian exports. With exports to EFTA-6
included, this share increases to 76%.
Even though different studies arrive at different quantitative
conclusions on the potential levels of trade openness and trade diver-
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sion with respect to intra-CEEC trade, depending on the estimates of
GDP and trade, which could not be valued according to market prices
before the transition, they coincide on the large potential that exists for
an increase in trade with Western European countries compared with
the level prevailing before the collapse of COMECON. The share of the
fifteen EU member countries in selected CEEC’s trade indeed rose
from about 42% (being already considerably higher than their share in
the early 1980s) to 61% of their total trade during the 1990s. Slovenia
and Slovakia are seemingly exceptions from such dynamics with
volatile trade behavior during the early 1990s. In the case of those
countries stagnation and slow growth of the EU share in their total trade
during the 1990s resulted from the dissolution of multi-national states
and the conversion of trade with the former members of the federations
to international trade, which reduced the share of EU members in total
trade. If the effect of the dissolution is excluded, the dynamics of their
geographical trade pattern do not substantially diverge from the dynam-
ics observed in other countries.
Figure 2 Share of the EU-15 in Central and Eastern European countries
merchandise trade (in %)
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In addition to the above-mentioned factors, GDP growth also
affected the dynamics of international trade. Countries that grew faster
during the 1990s ended up trading more both in volume and as a propor-
tion of GDP. GDP dynamics were also influenced by success in the imple-
mentation of structural reforms, so it was an additional reason for success-
ful countries increasing their trade openness and trade integration, while
less successful countries had lower trade shares and volumes on average.
During the second half of the 1990s, EU members’ share in
CEEC trade grew somewhat slower, although CEEC trade openness
continued to grow. Nilsson (1999) reported that by 1995 the CEEC’s
geographic trade pattern matched the trade structure of a typical devel-
oped country or OECD member. Brenton and Di Mauro (1998) reached
a similar conclusion from a more detailed analysis of trade flows
according to individual sectors, especially trade in sensitive products
such as apparel or agricultural products. As low-wage countries usual-
ly enjoy comparative advantages in the production of labor-intensive
products, the EU retained trade barriers for the imports of those prod-
ucts from the CEEC until the end of the 1990s. However, even trade in
sensitive products between the EU and the CEEC, regardless of the
existing tariffs and quotas, reached its potential by 1999. Therefore,
Brenton and Di Mauro did not expect it to grow further. Di Mauro
(2000) even proclaims the end of trade integration between the EU and
the CEEC and announces “deeper” integration characterized by
stronger foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.
The studies discussed are interesting since they indicate that the
CEEC were highly integrated with the EU by the mid-1990s, as far as
trade is concerned. However, the Commission's evaluation of their eco-
nomic readiness was not as enthusiastic. The Commission did not
acknowledge five of the candidate countries from central and east
Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia) and all three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania) as functioning market economies until 2000, when the
Commission published its third report on the progress made towards
accession by the candidate countries. However, even at that time all
those candidates, according to the Commission, needed to pursue fur-
ther reforms in order to be able to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union in the medium term and none of those
countries came any closer towards fulfillment of the second economic
criterion until 2002, or the last time they were included in the
Commission’s report. Bulgaria was recognized as a functioning market
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economy in the report for 2002, while Romania was the last to be
acknowledged, in the report for 2003.
CROATIAN TRADE INTEGRATION
INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Commission in its Opinion on the application of Croatia for
membership of the EU evaluated the same lengthy array of different
indicators of economic development, macroeconomic environment and
implemented structural reforms, which is supposed to show progress in
eleven areas of the Commission’s interest, as had been the case in the
previous applications. In its Opinion the Commission recognized
Croatia as a functioning market economy. However, the Commission
considered Croatia to be unable to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union, although Croatia should be able to sat-
isfy the second criterion provided that it continued implementing its
reforms to remove the remaining weaknesses.
Indicators of trade liberalization and trade openness constitute
one of the groups that the Commission evaluated within the second cri-
terion, in which Croatia scored rather favorably. Having in mind the
importance of trade for the Commission and even more for some
researchers, it seems justified to explore trade integration between the
Croatia and the EU in more detail. At the time of the declaration of
independence, with TOR being as high as 90%vi, Croatia was a very
open economy. However, while other CEEC became more open as the
transition advanced, Croatia became less open and the TOR continued
falling until the mid-1990s. The TOR decrease was not reversed until
the late 1990s and the period of more intense trade liberalization, when
it reached about 70%. TOR decline during the first couple of years after
independence was mostly due to reduced trade with former Yugoslav
republics, while trade with other countries stagnated, measured as a
proportion of GDP. Moreover, Croatian TOR was below the range of
90-130% where the CEEC’s TOR stood at the end of the 1990s, with
the exception of Poland, which is a large and therefore less open coun-
try. As trade openness is influenced by geographic location, transport
infrastructure, border regimes and a number of other factors that are
hard to quantify, it is difficult to state unambiguously whether Croatia
was a less open country in terms of foreign trade than the CEEC.
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Obviously, trade in services, especially tourism, is particularly impor-
tant for Croatia, which increases its openness.
Figure 3 Croatian trade openness ratio (in %)
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The extent of trade distortions existing in Croatia at the begin-
ning of the transition, according to some of the quoted studies, was
below that of other transition countries. However, although the former
Yugoslavia was not a member of COMECON, the collapse of the latter
amid the fall of the Iron Curtain led to a diversion of excess trade with
that block. Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991) suggest, based on an esti-
mated gravity equation, that Yugoslavian trade with the CEEC exceed-
ed the “natural” volume by 13 percentage points of the trade total at the
beginning of the 1980s, while, at the same time, trade with Northern
Europe fell short of “natural” trade levels by 18 percentage points. This
is a fairly small trade bias compared with the degree of trade reorienta-
tion needed in other CEEC, some of which, according to estimates
made by Havrylyshyn and Pritchett, needed to reorient almost three-
quarters of their trade. However, Croatia suffered from another type of
bias – the regulations of international trade encouraged trade with the
former Yugoslav republics. The data from the 1987 input-output tables
reveal that Croatian trade with the former Yugoslav republics was more
than two times larger than overall foreign trade.
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Figure 4 Geographical structure of Croatian foreign trade
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Croatian trade had been partially diversified prior to the break-up
of the former Yugoslavia, so by 1992 the share of the former Yugoslav
republics fell to less than a third of total trade. Diversification of imports
towards the other countries was particularly fast as imports quickly rose
after a slump caused by the break-up, while the rise in exports was much
less vigorous. The process of trade diversification continued until the
mid-1990s when the share of the former Yugoslav republics reached
about 15% of total trade. Since then, the proportion taken by the former
Yugoslav republics in Croatian trade has stagnated and even recovered
somewhat. Increase in the proportion taken by the EU was the other side
of the diversification process. Before the break-up of the former
Yugoslavia, EU members accounted for about 60% of Croatian trade,
and after the rise in bilateral trade, the share of EU members rose as well
and then stabilized in the first half of the 1990s at between 50% and 60%
of the total. Such a dynamic corresponds to a slight increase in the share
of EU members compared to the beginning of the 1990s due to the
break-up. If trade with former Yugoslav republics is excluded from the
total, the share of EU members reaches 65% of the rest.
There are no rigorous estimates on the size of the home-country
bias in the former Yugoslavia. However, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000)
find that the level of trade between Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, prior
to the break-up, exceeded the “normal” level 24 times. This figure is
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rather high in comparison with the above-mentioned estimates of
home-country biases prevailing in high-income countriesvii, but low in
comparison with other transition countries. For example, according to
the same study, trade flows among the three groups of newly independ-
ent (successor) countries – the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the three
Baltic States; and the Belarus-Russia-Ukraine area – exceeded “normal
trade” by 41-43 times. In accordance with the falling trade between the
Croatia and the former Yugoslav republics, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc
(2000) report that by 1998 the level of trade between Croatia and
Slovenia exceeded the “normal” level only two times, between the
Czech and the Slovak Republics seven times, 13 times among the
Baltic States and 30 times among Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.
The geographical pattern of Croatian trade does not reveal
whether Croatia has completed the transition in trade. Stabilization of
the geographical trade pattern along with a fairly high proportion taken
by EU members in total trade might suggest that Croatian trade con-
verged towards its potential. However, the stagnation of the Croatian
TOR somewhat below the TORs of other CEEC indicates the possibil-
ity of an interruption in trade transition. In order to shed more light on
that issue, a gravity model will be used to estimate the remaining bias-
es in the Croatian trade with the EU members, the CEEC and the for-
mer Yugoslav republics. The gravity model was estimated for three dif-
ferent time periods: 1999, 2002 and 2003. The first of those years is
interesting because it precedes Croatian WTO membership (Croatia
became a WTO member in 2000) and many other trade integrations (in
1999 Croatia had preferential trade agreements with Slovenia,
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovinaviii, while by 2003 the number
of preferential trade agreements had increased to 31, including all of the
old and new EU membersix along with the Norway, Switzerland,
Lichtenstein, Iceland and Turkey) so the gravity model will also esti-
mate first effects of trade agreements. As the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) is qualitatively different from the
Europe Agreements concluded between the EU and the CEEC at the
beginning of the 1990s, the future effects of the SAA will probably dif-
fer from the experience of the CEEC. On the one hand, Croatia man-
aged to reach a more favorable position than the CEEC since most of
the previous barriers to exports of sensitive products are absent from
the SAA. However, the Croatian SAA also has an important drawback
compared to the Europe Agreements since Croatia was not admitted
into the Pan-European Diagonal Cumulation of Origin, which is men-
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tioned as a serious obstacle to future expansion of trade even by the
European Commission (Brenton and Di Mauro, 1998; European
Commission, 2004; Mayhew, 1998). Discussion about the inclusion of
EU candidate countries into the system was vigorously debated at the
beginning of the 1990s. Baldwin (1994) particularly supported their
inclusion because he judged that leaving the candidates out of the sys-
tem would significantly weaken FDI inflows, which proved to be the
crucial prerequisite for successful trade integration.
Ordinary least squares were used in order to estimate nine grav-
ity models (encompassing exports, imports and total trade for all three
of the selected periods). The coefficient of determination in the estimat-
ed models falls within the acceptable range for gravity models (between
0.56 for exports in 1999 and 0.82 for total trade in 2003), with a grow-
ing tendency towards the end of the observed time span. Due to the het-
erogeneity of the countries included in the model, estimated model
exhibit heteroscedasticity in residuals, which is often the case in gravi-
ty literature, so standard errors were estimated using the Newey-West
procedure. Some of the estimated dummy variables are not significant
in individual or even all of the periods estimated, but they are neverthe-
less kept in the model because the goal of the estimated models was to
determine whether the actual Croatian trade flows diverge from the
potentials. Moreover, all the dummy variables were kept through all of
the periods in order to maintain the same structure in the model.
The gravity model reveals that total Croatian trade with the old
EU members did not significantly differ from the trade potentials
throughout the entire observed period. The actual level of imports was
estimated to be somewhat above the potential, while actual exports
were somewhat below the potential, although the dummy variables
denoting the trade flows with the old EU members were found to be
insignificant, which might arise from differing levels of integration
with different member states, so the level of the estimated parameter
could be interpreted as an indication of averaged different trade flows.
Actual trade with the CEEC exhibited a rising tendency with respect to
trade potentials so it exceeded the potential trade by 112% in 2003, aris-
ing from high and rising imports compared to their potential. Trade with
the old EU members exhibited similar dynamics. All of the trade poten-
tials were estimated on the basis of Croatian trade with the rest of the
world, comprising between a quarter and a fifth of total trade during the
observed time span, so trade potentials with the CEEC, old EU members
and former Yugoslav republics will be underestimated to the extent that
75
sosic-vujicic.qxd  22.3.2005  11:57  Page 75
there is unfulfilled trade potential with the rest of the world.
Construction of a gravity model for a larger group of developed coun-
tries, such as OECD members, and using it in order to estimate Croatian
trade potentials could partially solve this problem. However, in that case
the constructed model would exhibit the average propensity to trade of
those countries, which could differ from the Croatian propensity.
Table 1 Difference between the actual and potential Croatian trade (in %)
EU-15 CEEC Bosnia & Slovenia Macedonia Serbia &
Herzegovina Montenegro
Exports
1999 -27.4* -39.8* 5,713.9 410.5 2,132.2 62.8*
2002 -19.5* -36.4* 4,074.9 183.3 1,146.1 608.6
2003 -53.2* -57.4* 2,647.6 -1.7* 1,055.9 286.9
Imports
1999 61.7* 260.7 4,680.6 2,744.9 5,074.8 243.4
2002 54.6* 286.2 3,818.8 2,197.7 3,998.0 419.0
2003 85.5* 547.8 5,372.1 3,296.9 4,329.9 671.4
Total trade
1999 -10.3* 32.6 6,096.5 791.9 3,171.5 86.9*
2002 -15.0* 47.4 4,854.4 522.4 2,311.1 488.9
2003 -10.6* 112.0 5,734.1 626.1 2,536.7 546.2
* not statistically significant (at the 10% level)
Source: authors’ calculations
Regardless of the stated deficiencies, it is interesting to examine
the extent and persistence of biases that exist in trade with the former
Yugoslav republics. The largest bias, amongst the most recent observa-
tions, can be observed in trade with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
exceeded the potential by about 5,700%. The decrease and subsequent
increase of this bias can probably be traced to the abolishment and
renewal of the preferential trade agreement. High bias was also found
in trade with Macedonia, but it was reduced in recent years, which is
consistent with the conclusion of new trade agreements and diversifica-
tion of trade. Increase of trade with Serbia and Montenegro also
increased the bias, but it preceded conclusion of the preferential trade
agreement that came into force in 2003. Bias in trade with Slovenia was
high throughout the observed time-span, notwithstanding some minor
fluctuations, although bias in exports was decreasing and bias in
imports was growing.
Significant reduction of some estimated biases in exports during
the observed time span does not arise from the reduction of exports to
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the old EU members, CEEC and some of the former Yugoslav
republics, but rather from growing exports to the rest of the world. In
line with this notion, high estimated biases in Croatian trade with the
former Yugoslav republics do not necessarily mean that Croatia is trad-
ing to that extent above the true “potential”, for it might also signal
insufficient trade with other countries. Such a conclusion is supported
by Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) who find that the level of trade
between Croatia and Slovenia exceeded the “potential” only two times
in 1998, based on the estimated trade propensity of the OECD coun-
tries. Additional indicative confirmation is provided by Fidrmuc (2004)
who included Croatia in a large-scale gravity model estimated for a
total of 60 countries. On the basis of aggregation of estimated country-
specific fixed effects, Fidrmuc concludes that Croatia belongs to a
group of countries with significant unfulfilled trade potentials (Croatia
is positioned 51st amongst the 60 countries, with the level of trade inte-
gration with the world similar to Malta and somewhat higher than
Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Macedonia, Moldova, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Albania, which are positioned at the back, while all of
the CEEC, according to this indicator, were better integrated into world
trade than Croatia). It should be kept in mind that aggregation of fixed
effects also reflects a number of other country-specific factors,
although the rankings suggests that Croatia belongs to the group of
countries that are relatively poorly integrated into the world trade.
Another possible way to assess the level of trade integration with the
world is to include internal trade into the gravity model (McCallum,
1995; Wei, 1996). However, such an approach often relies on a number
of crucial assumptions with respect to the way the model is construct-
ed or on detailed statistical data on trade of individual territorial units
within the observed country (the same level of data aggregation is
preferable for trading partners as well), which is rarely available.
Even if all remnants of home-country biases between the Croatia
and the former Yugoslav republics disappear, common border and lan-
guage similarities will still encourage bilateral trade. Fidrmuc and
Fidrmuc (2000) explicitly account for the impact of the common border
that, according to their findings, increases the potential trade by about
half. Therefore, accounting for the border effects would reduce the dif-
ference between the findings of this paper and the results of Fidrmuc and
Fidrmuc (2000). Taking into the account their findings of the border
effect on trade would reduce the estimated bias in bilateral trade between
Croatia and the neighboring former Yugoslav republics by about a third.
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Regardless of the transformation of the Croatian trade pattern,
the estimated gravity model suggests that home-country bias in trade
with former Yugoslav republics remains significant. Moreover, the
conclusion of numerous preferential trade agreements initiated the
restoration of the old trade patterns and strengthened the trade links
with the former Yugoslav republics, working against further trade
diversification. The considerable Croatian delay in trade integration
with the old EU members and the CEEC seems to be related to the high
and even rising biases in trade with the former Yugoslav republics.
Brenton and Di Mauro (1998) conclude that liberalized access to some
of the CEEC on the EU’s internal market might result in the crowding
out of the other CEEC since they are direct competitors. Such a view is
opposite to the previous fears in some of the old EU members, especial-
ly the southern countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece), of compe-
tition from the CEEC, which generally proved to be unfounded. A
change in the attitude of the European Commission is especially visible
in the willingness to grant more favorable access to the EU market with
respect to sensitive products than was previously the case with the new
members. So far, only Croatia and Macedonia have managed to con-
clude preferential trade agreements in order to exploit this change in the
Commission’s attitude.
The Croatian economy, which lost ground on the EU market due
to delays in integration processes, is still making use of its favorable
access to the markets of former Yugoslav republics. Such a position pro-
vides only a temporary shelter, until those countries open up and provide
Croatian competitors an equal access to their markets. Design of the
“right” trade regime for Croatia would therefore reduce existing biases
in international trade and increase the long-term potential for growth.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Commission, as early as the first Opinion, rather
favorably assessed the Croatian ability to pursue further economic inte-
gration into the EU. New EU members did not earn comparable assess-
ment until 2000 (that is four years prior to the accession).
Notwithstanding the Commission’s assessment, the pattern and dynam-
ics of Croatian trade still exhibit a strong bias towards the former
Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in partic-
ular, although there is a stable bias towards Slovenia and a growing bias
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towards Serbia and Montenegro. Those biases evolved from inherited
trade patterns that were supported by the early conclusion of preferen-
tial trade agreements with some of those countries. The gravity analy-
sis performed does not clearly suggest any remaining trade potential
with the EU member states, which might result from the properties of
the gravity model as well as from differences in trade relations with
individual EU members. However, stagnation of the trade openness
ratio at a somewhat lower level than in the case of the other CEEC’s, as
well as findings from some recent research (Fidrmuc, 2004), suggest
precisely that.
Such a position with respect to trade integration can probably
best be explained by loss of ground in the market of the EU on account
of the competitors from the group of the CEEC that advanced faster in
trade integration. The lost ground cannot be recovered in the short run,
but trade integration with the EU should be accelerated in order to
reduce the existing biases and the long-term costs of trade restructuring.
This primarily pertains to the Pan-European Diagonal Cumulation of
Origin, to which Croatia is still not admitted. The CEEC, probably
Croatia’s most serious competitors on that market, are at the same time
full EU members after about a decade of participation in the Pan-
European Diagonal Cumulation of Origin. The existing system of bilat-
eral trade relations actually means that a large portion of trade between
Croatia and the EU is not carried out within a free trade regime, which
inhibits manufacturing FDI and hinders Croatian integration into
European production chains. Since a high level of trade integration has
been considered in this paper not only as a precondition for successful
economic integration but also as a consequence of the efficient removal
of institutional barriers to trade, in order to facilitate trade integration
with EU members it would be desirable for Croatia to join the EU as
quickly as possible. On the other hand, efforts to integrate more deeply
with countries of South-East Europe would only provide a temporary
shelter on markets of countries that are even less open than the Croatian
market. This strategy would increase the long-term costs of trade
restructuring so it should in no case be a policy priority.
Finally, in order to resolve the existing trade biases, it would be
more important to increase trade with countries where there is no
excess above the “potential” (especially EU members as well as other
countries that are not particularly emphasized in the analysis) than to
decrease trade with the former Yugoslav republics and with some of the
CEEC. Increased trade with those countries would also raise the level
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of trade openness, in which Croatia also lags behind. Empirical evi-
dence that points to the link between structural reforms and trade open-
ness suggests that fostering those reforms would be the correct way to
increase trade openness. According to the EBRD transition index,
Croatia, despite some recent improvements, still lags behind seven of
the new EU membersx in conduct of the reforms (EBRD, 2004).
Fostering reforms such as privatization, strengthening the rule of law
and reduction of the role of the state in the economy are therefore nec-
essary to increase trade integration as well as competitiveness, both
being preconditions for successful accession to the EU.
i The Europe agreements arranged between the transition countries that became EU
members in 2004 and the EU are the first generation of Association agreements
designed for the transition countries. Those agreements were concluded between
1993 and 1996, while they came into force in 1994 (Hungary and Poland), 1995
(Czech and Slovak Republics), 1998 (the three Baltic Republics) and 1999
(Slovenia).
ii Surplus on the services account of the balance of payments compensates to a large
extent for the exceptionally high Croatian trade deficit. Unfortunately, it is not pos-
sible to include trade in services into the gravity analysis because there are no data
on the geographic pattern on trade in services, although it would be more than jus-
tified in the case of Croatia. Analysis of the current account deficit, or comparison
of the actual current account deficit with the expected deficit on the basis of GDP
level and GDP growth (or demand for foreign savings), access to the international
financial markets (supply of foreign capital), would therefore be a more comprehen-
sive approach to the analysis of the trade deficit. Economic integration can fuel cap-
ital inflows, increasing the current account deficit and seemingly leading to a dete-
rioration in competitiveness, while higher foreign investments at the same time fos-
ter productivity growth (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002).
iii Usually only imports are included into gravity models because it is assumed that
their statistical coverage is better, due to the collection of customs. Since a single
country gravity model is utilized in this paper, imports and exports will be treated
separately, as well as total trade, or the sum of imports and exports.
iv In this paper Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia
are considered CEEC. Those countries used to belong to the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON), while today they are EU candidates or member
states.
v Although it is undisputable that borders reduce trade, there are different explana-
tions how and why this happens. While some researchers consider the home-country
bias in trade to be mostly a result of tariffs and endogenous historical developments,
such as the development of the transport network and other infrastructure (Djankov
and Freund, 2000), other researchers emphasize the role that a common currency
has in promoting trade (Rose, 2000), while others again point to the increase in the
costs of acquiring information when business is done across the borders (see, for
example, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
vi The jump of TOR after the proclamation of independence in part arises from the
reduction of foreign currency value of non-tradables due to hyperinflation and in
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part also from the conversion of trade with former Yugoslav republics to internation-
al trade (the difference between the full and the dotted line in the figure).
vii For example, Helliwell (1998) found that during the period 1993-96 the Canadian
provinces traded 12 times more among themselves than with US federal states,
accounting for the differences in incomes and distance.
viii Croatia concluded the first preferential trade agreement with Bosnia and
Herzegovina. However, the agreement was abolished in 1998 due to IMF demands
for Bosnia to increase custom revenues, but it was restored in January 2001 on an
asymmetrical basis. A preferential trade agreement with Slovenia has been in force
since January 1998 and with Macedonia from October 1997.
ix Including Luxembourg.
x Slovenia is the eighth country from that group and the only country with a somewhat
weaker transition index than Croatia.
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